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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Many writers throughout history have speculated on 
the causes of human happiness and life satisfaction. 
These conjectures have often dealt with inherited or 
acquired personality characteristics, or choices and 
fortune influencing life events. For example, Fielding 
(1963) in Tom Jones, implied through his main character 
that a sanguine temperament was more important than 
external advantages. The Ascetics held that detachment 
from the world led to well being, while the Stoics 
emphasized inner psychological causes of happiness. 
Others, particularly in contemporary times, have 
particularly stressed the importance of personal 
relationships (e.g., Gellner, 1985). 
Arguments as to the relative importance of each of 
these factors continue to the present time. However, 
the contention here is that debating the hegemony of 
one or the other of these variables provides 
perspectives which are less useful than those obtained 
through examining the interaction of the key factors. 
Fictional accounts of the human experience tend to 
support this point of view, and to emphasize 
personality and relational factors. The Tom Jones 
1 
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character was affected not only by a resilient 
temperament, but by fortuitous and disastrous 
interpersonal alliances as well. The classic character 
of Silas Marner (Eliot, 1968), presumably possessed of 
a more delicate constitution, was prompted to withdraw 
from social and religious life by the false accusations 
of others. Yet it was a loving relationship which 
restored him to humanity. In these accounts, 
relationships 
circumstances 
with others were among those 
impacting most powerfully on 
life 
the 
protagonists' experience of life. An aggregate 
conclusion from these sources might be that critical 
life circumstances, including interpersonal 
relationships, along with inherent qualities of the 
individual mediating these experiences, in large 
measure account for one's degree of happiness or 
satisfaction in life. 
There is an important distinction to be made 
between the fictional accounts of individuals noted 
above, and philosophical or religions beliefs speaking 
to the causes of happiness. In literature, subjective 
accounts of individuals are composed, whereas 
philosophical or religious tenets are prescriptive and 
presumably, objective. Faced with the choice of 
subjective versus prescriptive accounts, scientific 
investigations of life experience have generally chosen 
3 
to use the former, and contemporary empirical studies 
concerning subjective happiness have most often been 
based on subjects' self-reports. 
In many studies, happiness and related terminology 
have often been vaguely defined' and synonomously used. 
It was not until Bradburn's (1969) conception of 
"Psychological Well-Being", 
equivalent of happiness was 
that an operational 
generally agreed upon. 
Another term, "Subjective Well-Being" has been used 
interchangeably, and is more often used today. The 
construct involves both affective and cognitive 
components, specifically, the tendency of the 
individual to experience positive affective experiences 
over negative affectivity, and a conscious, cognitive 
self-evaluation by that individual of his or her life. 
The cognitive component of subjective well-being is 
referred to in the literature as "Life Satisfaction" 
(Diener, 1984). 
While there is general consensus that health, 
socioeconomic status, and degree of social interaction 
influence life satisfaction (Larson, 1978, Palmore, 
1979), more recent studies suggest that personality 
factors may be more important to both Subjective Well-
Being and Life Satisfaction than external demographic 
variables (Campbell, 1981, Diener, 1984) . In accord 
with this view, the present study will emphasize 
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personality dimensions rather than external contextual 
variables. Since the personality variables used here 
have been closely related to affective experiences, the 
cognitive component of Subjective Well- Being, Life 
satisfaction, will be specifically represented. 
However, as Subjective Well-Being and Life Satisfaction 
are similarly influenced by the same factors (Diener, 
1984), they are frequently studied together, often 
making their concurrent mention necessary in this 
study. 
The importance of stable personality traits has 
been emphasized in establishing reliable relationships 
between personality variables and Subjective Well-Being 
or Life Satisfaction (George, 1978). While a large 
number of personality dimensions have been proposed, 
the temperamental continuums of Extraversion-
Introversion and Neuroticism-Emotional Stability, first 
conceptualized by Hans Eysenck (1952), have held as the 
most consistently valid over time. 
Observed differences along these Eysenckian 
dimensions (temperaments) are believed to be 
manifestations of individual variations of physiology, 
which leave the Extravert with lower level of cortical 
arousal, and thus motivated to seek added stimulation. 
The Introvert is in contrast, overstimulated, and 
therefore more quiet and withdrawn. Those high in 
5 
Neuroticism are prone to experience more negative 
emotions such as anxiety and depression, become more 
emotionally engaged by stimuli, and take longer to 
return to baseline levels following emotional arousal 
than those who are more emotionally stable, or lower in 
Neuroticism (Eysenck, 1967). Thousands of studies 
conducted in cultures throughout the world have found 
consistent and significant differences between the 
Eysenckian temperamental types in many areas of human 
functioning (Eysenck, 1981). These include a wide 
variety of cognitive tasks, sensory thresholds and 
physical response rates, social behaviors, emotional 
experiences, and a myriad of other characteristics. 
The affective aspects of temperament may be more 
significant than is readily apparent. A confluence 
between many personality dimensions and studies of 
emotion has recently emerged in the literature. Meyer 
(1987) has proposed that the continuums of 
Extraversion-Introversion and Neuroticism-Stability 
actually encompass the same dimensions as Positive 
Affect and Negative Affect. Positive Af feet concerns 
feelings related to animation and involvement with 
life, while continuum of Negative Affect spans 
distressed versus peaceful feelings (Watson & Tellegen, 
1985). As presently conceived, Positive and Negative 
affect, though not identical to Bradburn•s (1969) 
6 
conceptualization in defining Psychological 
(Subjective) Well-Being, are quite similar. This would 
suggest that both Subjective Well-Being and Life 
satisfaction may be closely related to the Eysenckian 
temperamental dimensions. 
Research concerning the impact of early 
relationships on subsequent life experience has taken a 
much different course. With the advent of 
psychoanalysis, Freud also stressed innate biological 
factors from which human personality develops. The 
drives were seen to express themselves by creating 
tension states, which led to activity from the 
individual, and a subsequent response from the 
environment. Decisive environmental responses were 
presumed to come from parental figures, early on in the 
life of the child. The emphasis on early relational 
experiences was critical in the development of 
psychoanalysis, and is one of the foundations of the 
present study. 
Freud first used the term "object" to signify the 
person (or quality of that person) towards whom (or 
which) a drive was directed. For the infant, "object 
relations" involves either frustration or gratification 
of drive demands. Contemporary psychoanalytic theories 
place less emphasis on the drives, and assign object 
relations a primary importance in defining personality 
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development, through the quality of experienced object 
relations and their internalization. Modern object 
relations theory (e.g., Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983) 
contends that early childhood relationships are 
internalized, forming symbolic representations of the 
self and the object. These representations shape 
subsequent experiences of the self, as well as 
relations with others. The affective tone of early 
relational experiences is also internalized, and tends 
to be replicated in other relationships throughout 
life. From this perspective then, aspects of early 
relational experiences which are internalized form the 
foundations of important facets of personality 
structure. 
The representational dimensions examined in this 
study, Nurturance and Striving, have been shown to be 
particularly relevant in relation to depression (Blatt 
et al., 1979) • Nurturance is a composite of various 
aspects of emotionally accepting responses experienced 
by the individual, while Striving represents 
achievement-related internalizations. 
This study proceeds on the premise that inherent, 
biologically based personality factors, or temperaments 
(represented here as Extraversion and Neuroticism), 
mediate, and are themselves affected by internalized 
elements of early relational experiences (Nurturant and 
striving dimensions 
representations). 
of 
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internalized object 
These temperamental and 
representational elements will be examined in terms of 
their interaction, and used here as a framework of 
personality structure. These personality elements may 
have direct bearing on subjective Life Satisfaction, 
given the convergence of the proposed domains of 
emotion, temperament, and Life Satisfaction, along with 
the connection between representational dimensions and 
depression, a key manifestation of Negative Affect. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE 
Personality Structure 
As noted in the introduction, the interaction of 
temperamental and representational factors will be 
taken as a framework of personality in the present 
study. This view has been represented in the 
literature for some time. For example, Thomas et al. 
(1964) have demonstrated that based on infant 
temperament and aspects of the early subjective 
experience of mothering which are internalized, infants 
develop stable patterns of behavior and responsiveness 
by their second month. The authors note that these 
patterns are initially pliable, and are particularly 
shaped by the degree to which environmental responses 
are accepting and consistent. Yet despite their 
malleability, the infant's established patterns of 
personality clearly arbitrate the influences of the 
world at large. 
Although some connections have been established, 
research as to the ways in which temperament and early 
relational experiences combine is scarce; this is 
somewhat less true in regards to temperament and Life 
9 
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evident when examining 
and Life Satisfaction. 
to establish that all of 
satisfaction, but even more 
representational dimensions 
However, this study hopes 
these variables can be meaningfully related. 
While representational features of the experience 
of mothering are internalized after birth, the infant 
is born with temperamental characteristics, and it is 
with these innate elements which the present review of 
the personality literature will begin. 
Biologically Based Temperaments 
The importance of stable and broad based 
personality dimensions has been discussed since ancient 
times---for example, Hippocrates considered four basic 
temperament types (Choleric, Sanguine, Melancholic, and 
Phlegmatic). While there has been a plethora of 
temperamental and other personality dimensions proposed 
since, the continuums of Extraversion-Introversion 
(hereafter referred to as 
Neuroticism-Emotional Stability 
Extraversion) , 
(Neuroticism), 
and 
first 
conceptualized by Hans Eysenck (1952), have proven to 
be the most basic and well validated. 
These Eysenckian temperaments, or types, are 
believed to be manifestations of individual physiology, 
and involve four levels of behavior organization 
(Eysenck, 1947). At the lowest level are specific acts 
or behaviors, which coalesce to form 
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habituated 
responses tending to recur under similar circumstances. 
Habitual behaviors form higher level patterns and 
interactions, which can be identified and labeled as 
traits, such as persistence or irritability. Traits in 
turn associate with one another, grouping together to 
form the highest order construct in this model, the 
type. The four temperament types with which the 
present study will be concerned are Extraversion, 
Introversion, and high and low Neuroticism. 
Eysenck & Eysenck (1975) described the outward 
manifestations of these temperamental types: 
The typical Extravert is sociable, likes 
parties, has many friends, needs to have people to 
talk to, and does not like reading or studying by 
himself. He craves excitement, takes chances, 
often sticks his neck out, acts on the spur of the 
moment, and is generally an impulsive individual. 
He is fond of practical jokes, always has a ready 
answer, and generally likes change; he is 
carefree, easy-going, optimistic, and likes to 
'laugh and be merry'. He prefers to keep moving 
and doing things, tends to be aggressive and lose 
his temper quickly; altogether his feelings are 
not kept under tight control, and he is not always 
a reliable person. 
The typical Introvert is a quiet, retiring 
sort of person, introspective, fond of books 
rather than people; he is reserved and distant 
except to intimate friends. He tends to plan 
ahead, 'looks before he leaps' and distrusts the 
impulse of the moment. He does not like 
excitement, takes matters of everyday life with 
proper seriousness, and likes a well ordered 
mode of life. He keeps his feelings under close 
control, seldom behaves in an aggressive manner, 
and does not lose his temper easily. He is 
reliable, somewhat pessimistic, and places great 
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value on ethical standards. 
we may describe the typical high Neuroticism 
scorer as being an anxious, worrying individual, 
moody and frequently depressed. He is likely to 
sleep badly, and to suffer from various 
psychosomatic disorders. He is overly emotional, 
reacting too strongly to all sorts of stimuli, and 
finds it difficult to get back on an even keel 
after each emotionally arousing experience. His 
strong emotional reactions interfere with his 
proper adjustment, making him react in 
irrational, sometimes rigid ways ... If the high 
Neuroticism individual has to be described in one 
word, one might say that he is a worrier; his 
main characteristic is a constant preoccupation 
with things that might go wrong, and a strong 
emotional reaction of anxiety to these thoughts. 
The stable individual, on the other hand, tends to 
respond emotionally only slowly and generally 
weakly, and to return to baseline quickly after 
emotional arousal; he is usually calm, even-
tempered, controlled and unworried (p. 5). 
Eysenck (1967) suggested that individual 
differences along the continuum of Extraversion could 
be accounted for by differences in the central nervous 
system--specifically, functional variations of the 
reticular arousal system (RAS) of the brain stem. The 
RAS is thought to be responsible for monitoring a wide 
array of internal and external stimuli. Introverts 
appear to have systems which screen fewer stimuli, 
resulting in higher resting levels of cortical arousal. 
They therefore tend to avoid added stimulation. 
Extraverts, receiving less stimulation due to greater 
screening activity of the RAS, attempt to raise their 
lowered cortical arousal level by seeking social and 
other excitations. 
For the Neuroticism dimension of personality, it 
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is proposed that the limbic system of the autonomic 
nervous system differs across individuals in its 
activation threshold. The limbic system is thought to 
be where many emotional responses originate; those high 
in Neuroticism become more emotionally engaged by 
stimuli, as their systems are more easily aroused, and 
take longer to return to baseline levels after 
emotional arousal. In addition, as the limbic system 
is situated directly above the RAS there are excitatory 
neural connections between the two systems. Thus, when 
the limbic system is stimulated there is an increase in 
RAS activity, causing those high in Neuroticism person 
to respond to stimulation in a manner similar to 
Introverts. Since individuals low in Neuroticism are 
less easily engaged by stimuli, their response style is 
more influenced by their location on the Extraversion 
end of the continuum. 
As mentioned, there has been a multitude of 
personality traits proposed throughout history. 
However, measures devised in this century to measure a 
wide variety of seemingly disparate traits have 
consistently and clearly represented Extraversion and 
Neuroticism (Costa & Mccrae, 1985). Wiggins (1968) 
termed the Eysenckian dimensions "the big two". Costa 
& Mccrae (1976) cluster analyzed scales from the 
Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (Cattell, 
Eber, & Tatsuoka, 1970), 
14 
finding Extraversion and 
Neuroticism as two of the three underlying domains 
represented. 
Eysenck (1981) reported that over 5000 studies of 
the Extraversion and Neuroticism typologies have been 
carried out. Studies comparing typologies have found 
significant differences in learning, memory, sensory 
thresholds, physiological response patterns, rates of 
conditioning, and perceptual after-effects (Eysenck, 
1981), as well as social behavior (Wilson, 1981), pain 
tolerance (Barnes, 1975), and a host of other 
characteristics. 
Other research has shown these typologies to be 
stable and constant for up to 50 years (Conley, 1985, 
Guiganino & Hindley, 1982). The Extraverted and 
Introverted types have been consistently found across 
26 countries in all parts of the world (Eysenck et al., 
1986) through administrations of the Eysenck 
Personality Questionnaire (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975). 
There have also been adoption, twin and cross-
generational studies of the genetic heritability of the 
two typologies--these studies have generally found a 
heritability of about 50% (Loehlin, 1985, Young, Eaves 
& Eysenck, 1980). 
Although there has some work which relates 
temperamental variables to Life Satisfaction, before 
15 
these relationships can be reviewed, the nature of Life 
satisfaction must be clarified. 
subjective Well-Being and Life Satisfaction 
Throughout the literature, Life Satisfaction and 
related terminology have often been poorly defined and 
interchangeably used. In one review of the literature 
on Life Satisfaction, Trafton (1977) found the term 
equated with "happiness", "the will to live", "general 
adjustment", "psychological well-being", and "mental 
health". Herley (1984) found "happiness", well-being", 
"satisfaction", and "morale" to be closely related but 
not identical constructs, although they have often been 
treated synonymously in the literature. Before any 
coherent study can be attempted, Life Satisfaction must 
be distinguished from related but non-equivalent 
constructs. 
Perhaps the broadest and most important term to 
clarify is that of happiness. In equating happiness 
with success relative to some standard, Tatarkiewicz 
(1976) was generally consistent with historical 
cultural conceptualizations. In reviewing these 
conceptions, Coan (1977) found normative definitions 
concerned not with subjective feeling states, but 
possession of some desireable quality. The standard 
for this type of happiness is not the protagonistfs 
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subjective judgement, but the value framework of the 
observer. Thus when Aristotle designated virtue as the 
criterion against which people's lives may be judged, 
he did not mean that a virtuous life led to 
subjectively buoyant feelings. 
contemporary empirical efforts have been more 
often based on the consensus that subjective happiness 
is best judged by the individual in question, according 
to more personal standards (Bradburn, 1969, Campbell 
1981). There is now a large body of research based on 
this subjective approach. Bradburn's (1969) 
influential early work was based on his findings that 
positive and negative affect were independent 
dimensions. He found that positive affect related to 
greater levels of social contact and the experiencing 
of novel events, while negative affect was associated 
with fear, anxiety, and somatic symptoms. Bradburn 
denoted happiness as the degree to which an individual 
experiences a preponderance of positive affect over 
negative affect. Bradburn substituted the term 
"Psychological Well-Being" for happiness; while this 
term has since been used interchangeably with 
"Subjective Well-Being", the latter is more commonly 
used today. 
In addition to Bradburn's affective component, 
Subjective Well-Being is now widely viewed as 
17 
containing an evaluative component; influences on 
subjective life evaluation have been the focus of a 
number of recent studies. (Campbell, 1981, Diener, 
l984). This subjective, conscious, and cognitive 
evaluation of one's life has been termed Life 
satisfaction. 
Most research in this area has found similar 
factors affecting both Life Satisfaction and Subjective 
well-Being (Diener, 1984). This is an important point, 
as several studies do not clearly distinguish between 
the two. Many of these studies have been cross-
sectional and have used different populations, while 
focusing on correlating a multitude of discrete life 
situation variables with Subjective Well-Being and 
Life Satisfaction. 
difficult to integrate. 
Results have therefore been 
Studies of this type which have been specific to 
Life Satisfaction have typically proceeded by asking 
subjects how satisfied they are with particular aspects 
of their lives, and their life overall. For example, 
from a 1982 General Social Survey using national 
probability sampling, Mookherjee (1987) analyzed data 
pertaining to reports of Life Satisfaction. Subjects 
(1506 adults, age 18 to 89) were asked attitudinal 
questions relating to satisfaction in the following 
aspects of their lives: Health, residence, family, 
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friendship, hobbies, financial condition, and condition 
of health. In addition, two questions were related to 
life as a whole. Life Satisfaction was measured by a 
cumulative score. Results indicated that race, marital 
status, and education were significant variables. 
White, married, and better educated persons were more 
satisfied with their lives than black, unmarried, and 
less well educated respondents. Mookherjee also 
concluded (tentatively) that overall Life Satisfaction 
increased with age and education. 
However, a number of authors have suggested that 
several specific variables appear to become more 
important to the elderly in evaluating Life 
satisfaction. Among these variables are health 
(Murphy, 1975), activity level (Peterson, 1974), and 
retirement attitude (Thorson, 1977). 
While observing that health, socioeconomic status, 
and degree of social interaction predicted both 
satisfaction and longevity, both Larson (1978) and 
Palmore (1979) noted another problem which has hampered 
these types of studies: The variables used accounted 
for only a small proportion of the variance reported in 
measures of Life Satisfaction and Subjective Well-
Being. 
These findings have been consistently replicated 
and many more recent studies have found psychological 
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Pe rsonality variables more important than and 
demographic factors to both Life Satisfaction and 
subjective Well-Being (Andrews & Withey, 1976, 
campbell, 1981, Diener, 1984, George, 1978). 
Life satisfaction and Personality 
Neugarten and her associates (1964, 1968) made 
significant early contributions to this area, 
particularly in relation to aging. They found that 
levels of activity often were important to aging 
successfully, and developed eight personality types 
which they believed mediated between Life Satisfaction 
and activity level. 
Others have particularly stressed the importance 
of stable personality traits in establishing reliable 
relationships between Subjective Well-Being or Life 
Satisfaction and personality (George, 1978). The 
enduring nature of temperament is particularly relevant 
in this respect; moreover, there is a correspondence in 
the literature between aspects of Extraversion and 
Neuroticism and the experience of Subjective Well-
Being. This correspondence comes through Watson & 
Tellegen's (1985) suggestion that the interaction of 
the domains of Positive Affect and Negative affect 
comprise the structure of affective experience. A 
closer examination of these domains is now in order. 
20 
E9sitive and Negative Affect 
Meyer (1987) has argued that the temperamental 
personality dimensions of Extraversion and Neuroticism 
and the affective dimensions of Positive and Negative 
Affect actually tap the same dimensions of human 
experience. There is a growing body of research 
concerning the confluence of emotional experiences and 
personality. While a full review is beyond the scope 
of this paper, the highlights will be noted. 
Watson & Tellegen (1985) have proposed that two 
orthogonal affective traits, Positive Affect and 
Negative Affect, underlie the experience of emotion. 
Those experiencing high Positive Affect feel 
excitement, enthusiasm, and a general zest for life, 
while low Positive Affect is manifested by fatigue, 
sleepiness, and general low energy. Negative Affect is 
characterized by feelings of distress, nervousness and 
hostility; those low in Negative Affect experience 
peaceful feelings (Watson & Clark, 1984). 
Watson & Tellegan (1985) note that it is only the 
high end of each affective dimension which represents 
the experience of emotion; low ends of the dimensions 
relate a lack of affective arousal. Thus, pleasant and 
unpleasant emotional states are seen as interactions 
between the independent dimensions of Positive and 
Negative affect. For example, subjective experiences 
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of peacefulness or pleasure indicate a combination of 
high Positive Affect and low Negative Affect, while 
sadness or unhappiness are a blend of high Negative 
Affect and low Positive Affect. 
The importance of Positive and Negative affect to 
subjective Well-Being and Life Satisfaction has already 
been noted. Recall that in Bradburn's (1969) 
conception, individual Psychological Well-Being was 
determined by the relationship between the independent 
dimensions of positive and negative affect. While 
Bradburn's measure of these dimensions were not 
identical to Watson and Tellegen's (1984) conceptions, 
they were similar. Bradburn (1969) found positive 
affect to be associated with the experiencing of new 
events and more social contacts, while negative affect 
was related to anxiety, fear, and somatic symptoms. 
These factors related to Bradburn's positive and 
negative affect are identical to what have been seen as 
manifestations of Extraversion and Neuroticism. 
Mccrae & Costa (1990) have extended the work of 
Hans Eysenck, adding three personality types to 
Eysenck's Extraversion and Neuroticism dimensions 
(Agreeableness, Openness to Experience, and 
Conscientiousness). These authors have also examined 
the effects of their personality dimensions on 
Subjective Well-Being. They found Extraversion to be 
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Ociated with positive affect but not with negative ass 
affect, while Neuroticism was associated with negative 
affect but not positive affect (Costa, Mccrae, & Norris 
l981, Costa & Mccrae, 1984). 
The similarity of Positive affect to Extraversion 
and Negative affect to Neuroticism has been noted by 
those most involved with the present conceptualization 
of positive and Negative affect (Watson & Clark 1984, 
watson & Tellegan, 1985). These authors have stopped 
short of equating their constructs with the Eysenckian 
dimensions, even though Neuroticism has been 
established as one of the best measures of Negative 
Affect (Meyer, 1987). This question will not be 
debated here; it is enough for the purposes of this 
study to note the high degree of correspondence between 
Extraversion and Positive Affect, and Neuroticism and 
Negative Affect, as well as the influence of Positive 
and Negative Affectivity on Subjective Well-Being, and 
Life Satisfaction. 
relationships 
With these links established, the 
between temperamental and 
representational dimensions of personality can now be 
discussed. 
Personality and Parental Representations 
There have been few empirical efforts which 
examine how Extraversion and Neuroticism might interact 
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with early parental relationships. The most relevant 
of these appears to be Mccrae & Costa's (1988) effort, 
which correlated adult children's ratings of their 
parents' behaviors on the Parent-Child Relation 
Questionnaire II (Siegelman & Roe, 1979) with 
personality dimensions measured by the NEO Personality 
Inventory (Costa & Mccrae, 1985). They found that 
subjects who reported more loving parents scored lower 
in Neuroticism and higher in Extraversion. Those who 
described their parents as casual rather than demanding 
scored lower in Extraversion, and parental attention 
(i.e., spoiling) was associated with Extraversion. All 
associations were modest, and several alternative 
explanations to child rearing practices were proposed 
to explain results. 
Although Mccrae & Costa's parental qualities would 
seem to be similar to dimensions of object 
representation used in the present study, their 
instructions to subjects stressed parental behaviors 
"before the time you were twelve". The focus on 
adolescence rather than earlier childhood makes it 
difficult to extend the authors' conclusions to the 
present study. However, these results will be used 
here as a heuristic starting point. 
As previously noted, the focus in this paper will 
be on very early relational experiences, which are 
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. wed as profoundly influential on the infant and it's 
vie 
developing personality structure. Before relatin9 
these experiences to the variables of this study, a 
review of object relations theory is necessary. 
Object Relations Theory 
Greenberg & Mitchell (1983) noted that the term 
"object relations theory" has been used to denote a 
wide array of theoretical systems within the larger 
body of psychoanalysis. The term "object" was first 
used by Freud to signify the person (or quality of that 
person) towards whom a drive was directed. For Freud, 
an infant's object relations were derivatives of drive 
demands, as there could be no drive expression without 
a drive object, whether external or implicit. Objects, 
for the infant, either gratified or frustrated the 
drives. 
However, contemporary theories give object 
relations a more primary importance, defining 
personality development in terms of the quality of 
experienced object relations and their internalization. 
A general description of theories falling under the 
object relations umbrella was given by Bell, 
Billington, & Becker (1986): 
Personality develops from experiences in 
early childhood relationships that produce 
internal self-other representations. These serve 
as templates for contemporary experience. With 
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normal development these internal mental 
structures would grow more complex, 
differentiated, and flexible according to more or 
less definable stages of development. 
psychopathology would result from disruption of 
this pattern of psychological growth, and various 
psychopathological conditions have been described 
as arrested development at a particular stage 
(pp. 733-4). 
The "internal self-other representations", or 
object representations, involve images of important 
others (objects) and the developing self. They are at 
the heart of object relations theory. There is an 
abundance of terms for this general concept in the 
psychoanalytic literature, each with a slightly 
different shade of meaning. For example, Blatt & 
Lerner (1983a, p.190) described "cognitive affective 
schemata"; other theories have used "internal objects", 
"illusory others'', "introjects", "personifications", 
and the "constituents of a representational world" 
(Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, p.11). Greenberg and 
Mitchell themselves signified "internal images and 
residues of external relations" (p.12) as the broadest 
delineation of this concept. 
As this latter description connotes, object 
representations are generally thought to contain three 
distinctive components--for example, in the terminology 
of Kernberg (1976), these are: Images of the self, the 
object, and an "affective coloring" of the 
interpersonal experience. This affective coloring may 
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be seen as roughly synonymous to Greenberg and 
Mitchell's "residues of external relations". 
The role of object representations is viewed in 
similar fashion throughout the literature, that is, 
there are many somewhat different conceptions within a 
generally coherent framework. Various theories 
alternately view them as determinants of how the self 
and others are subjectively experienced (Blatt & 
Lerner, 1983a), as guides as to what can be expected in 
interpersonal relationships (Bemporad, 1980), as 
suppliers of moral guidance or punishment (Atwood & 
Stolorow, 1981), or other forms of support or 
persecution in times of stress (Greenberg & Mitchell, 
1983) . 
Developmental theories of object relations view 
the infant's earliest experiences of self, object, and 
relatedness as variable and undifferentiated episodes 
of pleasure or frustration (Fraiberg, 1969, A. Freud, 
1965, Jacobson, 1964). The child gradually builds 
increasingly stable and differentiated representations, 
which are accompanied by affective components. But it 
is the infant's experience of the early caretaker-child 
relationship along with it's affective tenor which is 
initially internalized, providing the basic 
differentiation of reality and the cornerstone of 
personality organization (Blatt & Lerner, 1983a). This 
27 
. •ti'al internalization provides the basis for the 
1n1 
development of self and other representations (Camper~ 
1983 ). Melanie Klein (1959), among the first to focus 
attention on this period of development, suggested that 
self-representations emerge from the original symbiosis 
with the primary caretaker. As the child' s internal 
perceptions begin to incorporate external reality, the 
sense of oneness with the primary caretaker is 
gradually altered, and the separateness of self and 
object acknowledged. 
Healthy development of self and object-
representation culminates in a stable sense of self 
which is integrated, autonomous, and which can 
experience others empathically, but as separate from 
the self (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975). In Mahler's 
view, the process of self-other differentiation 
involves two critical, alternating elements, separation 
and individuation. During separation, the child 
emerges from it's symbiotic merger with the mother, 
allowing individuation, or the establishment of a 
distinct self-identity (representation). As self-
representation develops, the child is able to tolerate 
continuing and greater separations from the mother 
while developing increasingly sophisticated 
representations of significant others. The mother' s 
response to the child's assertions during this process 
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is vi tally important, as noted by Winnicott ( 1965) . 
The "good enough mother" will be able to tolerate the 
child's moves towards autonomy and self-representation, 
as well as meeting dependency needs, thereby 
facilitating healthy formation of object 
representations. 
The structure of early caretaking relationships 
will tend to be replicated in other relationships 
throughout life (Blatt & Lerner, 1983a). The early 
structure and tone of the child's experience with the 
initial caretaker is thought to be strengthened through 
patterns of behavior which actualize existing self and 
other-representation (Atwood & Stolorow, 1981). These 
patterns of behavior also encourage others to act in 
ways which repeat important aspects of internalized 
object representations. 
Other sources have provided evidence for differing 
but hierarchical representational structures, for 
example, parental representations versus social 
representations (Lewicki, 1976). Sandler & Sandler 
(1978) suggested that early forms of object relations 
can exist concurrently with more recent 
internalizations. Regression to earlier forms of 
relating to self and others is believed to occur under 
duress. 
While self and object representations are thought 
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to be relatively stable and enduring (Blatt & Lerner, 
1983a, cashdan, 1988, Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983), 
these representations also become increasingly flexible 
and complex with healthy development, so that: 
There is a constant and reciprocal 
interaction between past and present interpersonal 
relationships and the development of object 
representations, and these developing 
representations, in turn, provide a revised 
organization for experiencing new, more complex 
facets of interpersonal relationships (Blatt & 
Lerner, 1983b, p.9). 
It is this process which clinicians attempt to 
facilitate in their patients (Cashdan, 1988, Greenberg 
& Mitchell, 1983), a process often impaired due to 
internalization of destructive relational elements, or 
lack of necessary positive features such as nurturance. 
However, Wallace ( 1982) found that creating unusual 
interactions in the family milieu changed existing self 
and object representations among individual family 
members, allowing the possibility for growth and new 
adaptations. Wallace contended that not only could 
insight sought in the traditional psychoanalytic 
approach lead to altered family interactions, but that 
novel family interactions could also lead to new 
insights. 
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object Representation Research 
Empirical studies in this area have been based on 
two main assumptions: 1) that dimensions of an 
individual's representational structure can be measured 
along a developmental continuum (Bell, Billington & 
Becker, 1986, Urist, 1973) , and 2) that ambiguous 
stimuli are organized by the individual according to 
aspects or projections of his or her inner 
representational world (Blatt & Lerner, 1983a, 
McClelland, 1980, Ryan, Avery, & Grolnick, 1985). 
Martin Mayman (1967) was among the first to link 
object relations theory with projective test data. 
Mayman and his associates at the University of Michigan 
have made use of several projective sources, including 
manifest dreams and written autobiographical material, 
as well as initiating new inquiry techniques to 
Rorschach and TAT responses. Mayman found that the 
content of human responses to Rorschach blots 
correlated with independent assessments of 
interpersonal relations, severity of psychiatric 
symptoms, and motivation for change (Mayman, 1967). 
Other evidence has suggested that animal responses 
contain important references to subjects' inner 
representational worlds (Mayman, 1967, Urist, 1973). 
Mayman ( 1968) also introduced a new assessment 
procedure, the Early Memories Test. His 
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conceptualization and use of early memories are 
illustrative of the direction and expanding influence 
of object relations theory and research: 
Early memories are expressions of important 
fantasies around which a person's character 
structure is organized; early memories are 
selected (unconsciously) by a person to conform 
with and confirm ingrained images of himself and 
others; the themes which bind together the 
dramatis personae of a person's early memories 
define nuclear relationship patterns 
which are likely to repeat themselves 
isomorphically in a wide range of other life 
situations (Mayman, 1968, p.304). 
Mayman' s work has focused heavily on content and 
thematic elements of object representations. In doing 
so, he has made important contributions involving the 
translation of abstract psychoanalytic terminology to 
more empirically-related terms which remain relevant to 
clinical phenomenology. Thus for example, Mayman 
initially redefined "superego" as "hostile or loving 
introjects", while "ego structure" became "the self" or 
"identity" (Mayman, 1963). 
With it's strong qualitative bent, Mayman's group 
has often been concerned with construct validation of 
important object relational constructs. For example, 
Krohn (1972) found the construct "level of object 
representation" to be a valid psychological dimension, 
involving degree of differentiation, consistency, and 
variety of object representation; further, that this 
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dimension could be reliably measured by manifest 
dreams, early memories, and Rorschach responses. Urist 
(1973) assessed integrity (consistency) of object 
representation in a pathological population. He found 
that subjects tended to describe people in a consistent 
way across Rorschach and TAT responses, and in written 
autobiographical material, suggesting that object 
representations are consistent, relatively stable 
definitions of self and others. 
In addressing structural dimensions of object 
representations, Urist (1977) also developed a 
Mutuality of Autonomy Scale (MAS), which assessed level 
of self-object representations based on Rorschach 
responses. The scale was designed to measure degrees 
of development in the separation-individuation process, 
with an emphasis of self-autonomy. The MAS scale 
ranges from the experience of relatedness of self to 
another as characterized by imagery of dominance and 
control, (or conversely, others are experienced as an 
extension of the self), to more autonomous experiences 
allowing for the integrity of both self and other, with 
mutual interaction and common goals. This is 
consistent with general object relations theory, which 
contends that excessively controlling or inconsistent 
objects result in more primitive internalized object 
representations. Urist {1977) found that for a group 
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of psychiatric inpatients, there were significant 
correlations between the MAS, staff evaluation of 
mutuality of autonomy, and ratings based on patient 
auto- biographies. The results supported the use of 
the Rorschach as valid in measuring self-object 
representations as well as a structurally based 
consistency of subjects' levels of object relations. 
In another study using the MAS, Ryan, Avery, & 
Grolnick (1985) 
(fourth to sixth 
used a non-clinical 
graders). Results 
child sample 
indicated that 
children with more mature object representations were 
perceived by teachers as being more socially 
adjusted, displaying better attention, possessing 
higher self-esteem, and as working more effectively 
than others. The behavioral correlates to qualities of 
object representation support the theoretical 
assertions of representational influence on 
personality. As was the case in Urist's (1977) study, 
there was convergence between self-report, projective, 
and behavioral ratings, strengthening the suggestion an 
underlying structure of self-object representation. 
Another research group, Sidney Blatt and his 
colleagues at Yale, have particularly focused on 
structural dimensions of object representation, using 
quantitative analyses primarily of Rorschach responses, 
but also the TAT, manifest dream content, and open-
ended descriptions of significant figures. 
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They have 
established a number of assessment procedures for 
object representations and studied the relationship of 
object representation to normal and pathological 
(particularly schizophrenic and depressive) 
development. In summarizing their work, Blatt & Lerner 
(1983a) stated: 
Conceptualizations and empirical findings 
have led to the discovery of differentiations 
within the broad diagnostic categories of 
depression and schizophrenia. Findings also 
demonstrate that the structure of object 
representations continue to develop throughout the 
life cycle into early adolescence and adulthood, 
and that the quality of object representations 
provides insight into psychotic and the depressive 
experiences that has implications for the 
therapeutic process (p. 196). 
Blatt & Ritzler (1974) found that differing levels 
of schizophrenia could be identified by defining 
varying levels of boundary disruptions displayed in 
patients' Rorschach responses. The authors defined 
boundary differentiation as including: 
The initial capacity to differentiate between 
independent objects, including self-nonself, and 
later to differentiate between the actual object 
and the mental representation and verbal signifier 
used to designate the object differentiation 
between outside and inside (pp. 371-2). 
Patients with greater boundary disturbances had 
responses indicating less appropriate and realistic 
thought, with less cognitive and affective control. 
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These patients were less involved with the hospital, 
1ess responsive to intervention, and displayed more 
disrupted representations of human figures. The 
authors concluded that increasing degrees of boundary 
disruptions effectively indicated the extent and 
severity of thought disorder present. 
A comprehensive system was developed by Blatt et 
al. (1976), designed to assess representations of human 
figures of Rorschach responses in terms of 
differentiation, articulation, and integration. 
According to Blatt's system, more mature levels of 
object representation are displayed in whole, well 
articulated human responses, while more primitive 
representations lead to less articulated, part-object 
responses. The system scores human responses along a 
developmental continuum in six categories: 
Differentiation, articulation, motivation of action, 
integration of object and action, content of action, 
and nature of interactions. Disturbances or 
distortions within these categories were found on 
inspecting the Rorschach protocols of five psychiatric 
inpatients with diagnoses ranging from non-paranoid 
schizophrenia, to borderline-narcissistic character 
disorder, to anaclitic and introjective depression. In 
other words, the authors found that the various 
pathologies of these patients could be described in 
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terms of disturbances of object representations across 
the categories mentioned. 
liurturance and Striving 
In a study which used a non-clinical sample, 
Blatt, Wein, Chevron, & Quinlan (1979) investigated the 
relation between depression in adults and aspects of 
early family life, employing a measure they call The 
Family Interaction Questionnaire. The measure is 
actually a booklet, the first two pages of which 
instruct subjects to describe their parents. The next 
section is a version of the Semantic Differential 
(Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957) involving more 
structured descriptions of parents and self. The rest 
of the booklet includes various measures of depression. 
The unstructured descriptions of parents were 
rated on a seven-point scale for thirteen adjectives, 
which loaded onto two factors, termed "Nurturant" 
(Factor I), and "Striving" (Factor II). The degree of 
ambivalence expressed towards each parent was also 
rated, as was conceptual level (cognitive complexity) 
of the parental descriptions. 
There were a number of significant correlations 
between the unstructured parental descriptions and 
ratings of each parent on the semantic differential. 
Most impressive, and relevant to the present study in 
37 
terms of construct validity, was the highly significant 
(g < .001) positive correlations between the Nurturant 
(Factor I) scale of the unstructured descriptions (of 
both parents) with all three basic factors (evaluation, 
potency, and activity) of the semantic differential. 
rt was primarily the Nurturant scale of the 
unstructured parental descriptions which correlated 
significantly with measures of depression. Unstructured 
descriptions of both mother and father as nurturant 
also were significantly correlated with a positive 
self-description on the semantic differential. 
conceptual level of unstructured parental descriptions 
was found to be related to different types of 
depression theorized elsewhere by Blatt (Blatt, 1974, 
Blatt & Lerner, 1983b), and those subjects with low 
depression scores had the highest conceptual levels in 
their parental descriptions. 
The authors concluded that parental images can be 
effectively assessed by the methods used, and that "It 
is the perception of parents as lacking in nurturance, 
support, and affection {Factor I} which is related to 
depression rather than perception of parents as 
striving, harsh, and judgmental {Factor II} (p.394)." 
Moreover, it appears that depression can be placed on a 
continuum related to the conceptual level of parental 
representation (signified by written descriptions) 
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present in the individual. 
The adjectival descriptors which comprise 
Nurturance involve emotionally nourishing responses 
experienced by the individual, while striving 
adjectives relate to achievement-related 
internalizations. Other studies (e.g., Jacobson, 
Fasman, & DiMascio, 1975) have found consistent and 
significant associations between depression in adults 
and parental (object) representational structures which 
lack nurturing elements. Representational elements 
related to striving for excessive achievement and 
success are seen as attempts to win love and approval 
(Blatt et al., 1979), perhaps implying an under-
representation of nurturing elements. 
The present study will limit itself to the open-
ended parental descriptions from which the Nurturance 
and Striving representational dimensions are measured. 
In addition to mother and father descriptions, this 
study will add a description of a significant other 
person to each subject. 
Representations. Temperament, and Life Satisfaction 
As noted above, representational structures 
lacking Nurturance have been strongly associated with 
depression in both normal and clinical populations. 
High levels of Striving may also imply a proclivity for 
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depressive experiences. Thus, the common theme of 
affect, which runs across the temperamental and Life 
satisfaction variables used here, can be seen to 
pertain to representational variables as well, as 
depression is one of the primary displays of Negative 
Affect. 
Statement of Hypotheses 
Relationships Between Personality Variables 
1) As has been established, Neuroticism is a 
powerful representative of Negative Affect. The 
significant relationship of Nurturance to depression 
might also be explained through it's relationship to 
Positive and Negative Affect, the common thread which 
runs through all of the variables used here. The 
emotionally nourishing nature of Nurturance, which is 
comprised of adjectives such as "affectionate" and 
"nurturant", would seem antithetical to experiences of 
Negative Affectivity. Therefore, it is expected that 
Nurturance and Neuroticism will be negatively 
correlated. 
2) It cannot be expected that Extraversion, 
being similar to Positive Affect, will then be 
positively correlated to Nurturance. Both Extraversion 
and Positive Affect do not simply involve pleasant 
emotion, which is rather, a combination of high 
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positive Affect and low Negative Affect. Both 
Extraversion and Positive Affect do involve positive 
emotions, but in addition are comprised of qualities 
related to animation and high levels of energy, which 
1ead to active involvement in life stimuli. There is 
no indication that the adjectives comprising Nurturance 
necessarily relate to this type of life involvement, 
even though positive emotional experiences might be 
expected to be associated with high levels of 
Nurturance. Therefore, a significant correlation 
between Extraversion and Nurturance is not expected. 
3) The adjectives loading onto the 
representational dimension of Striving include 
"judgmental" and "punitive". These would seem to be 
qualities which might induce negative affectivity. In 
addition, as was previously mentioned, Blatt et al., 
(1979) conceptualized Striving elements as attempts to 
win love and approval. This might imply a relative 
lack of internalized Nurturance features. Therefore, a 
positive correlation between Neuroticism and Striving 
is hypothesized. 
4) "Ambitious" is another descriptor loading onto 
the Striving representational dimension. This factor, 
along with Blatt et al. 's (1979) view of Striving as 
representing active efforts to attain approval and 
affection, does seem more likely to result in seeking 
stimulation and greater 
to the activities, 
individual. 
Extraversion 
correlated. 
similar 
Accordingly, it 
and Striving 
involvement in 
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life 
high Extra version 
is hypothesized that 
will be positively 
5) In going beyond the simple association of 
temperamental and representational qualities to the 
consideration of how these qualities might shape one 
another, an examination of how varying levels of the 
temperamental and representational dimensions interact 
will be made. Thomas et al. 's ( 1964) assertion that 
infants develop stable patterns of behavior by their 
second month based on temperament and internalized 
aspects of the infant-caretaker relationship has been 
noted. As the infant begins life with it's 
temperament, the premise here is that manifestations of 
a particular temperament will elicit varying responses 
from caregiving figures, based on 
personality characteristics and life circumstances of 
the caregiver in question. A baby born with a 
physiology producing high levels of Neuroticism might 
be expected to introduce negative stimuli to it's 
environment, for example, crying more than others, and 
being less easily soothed. Consistent displays of this 
type of behavior could provoke harsher responses from 
the caregiver, or at least fewer positive responses. 
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If high Neuroticism is combined with high 
Extraversion, the infant could be expected to exert 
it's Negative Affectivity on it's environment in a more 
vigorous manner, as it also needs to seek high levels 
of stimuli. At the same time, combining high 
Neuroticism with low Extraversion (the Introverted 
temperamental type), might result in a less intrusive 
child, but one which still provided negative 
experiences for the caregiver, for example, sullenness 
or unresponsiveness. This line of reasoning suggests 
that Neuroticism is the temperamental variable which 
impacts most on Nurturance. Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that regardless of the degree of 
Extraversion present in the individual, high 
Neuroticism will combine with low Nurturance. 
6) While it is believed here that Neuroticism 
rather than Extraversion is most influential on 
Nurturance, the other representational dimension, 
Striving, may be affected differently. Recall that 
hypotheses 3 and 4 predict positive correlations 
between Neuroticism and Striving and Extraversion and 
Striving, respectively. These predictions suggest that 
both temperamental variables are important to Striving. 
With this premise, it is expected that high levels of 
both Extraversion and Neuroticism should result in the 
highest Striving scores, and low levels of both 
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Extraversion and Neuroticism the lowest Striving 
scores. 
Life satisfaction 
7) The connections established between all of the 
variables used in this study to positive and negative 
affect make predictions concerning Life Satisfaction 
relatively straightforward. As Life Satisfaction is a 
component of Subjective Well-Being (one component of 
which is Bradburn's {1969} positive and negative 
affect), and is affected similarly by the same 
variables (Diener, 1984), Extraversion (similar to the 
dimension of Positive Affect {Meyer, 1987}) should be 
closely related. It is therefore hypothesized that 
Extraversion and Life Satisfaction will be positively 
correlated. 
8) Neuroticism, a good representative of Negative 
Affect, is easily seen as opposed to Life Satisfaction. 
Accordingly, a negative correlation between Neuroticism 
and Life Satisfaction is predicted. 
9) Although Nurturance is viewed here as 
conducive to pleasant emotional experiences, this is 
not the same as Positive Affectivity. However, it does 
argue against the presence of negative affect. High 
levels of Nurturance, by discouraging negative 
emotional experiences, may affect levels of Life 
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satisfaction. It is hypothesized then, that Nurturance 
and Life Satisfaction will be positively correlated. 
10) Since Striving is expected to relate 
positively to both Extraversion and Neuroticism, and 
thus contain aspects of both Positive and Negative 
affect, no significant correlation is expected between 
striving and Life Satisfaction. 
11) Bradburn's (1969) components of (Subjective) 
well-Being are, as mentioned, similar to Watson & 
Tellegen's (1985) Positive and Negative Affect, as are 
Extraversion and Neuroticism (Meyer, 1985). If it is 
recalled that the same variables affect Subjective 
Well-Being and Life Satisfaction in comparable ways, it 
is easily predicted that Extraversion would encourage 
higher levels of Life Satisfaction, and Neuroticism 
lower levels of Life Satisfaction. Therefore, it 
expected that the highest Life Satisfaction scores will 
occur in subjects who have high Extraversion and low 
Neurotic ism scores, and that the combination of low 
Extraversion and high Neuroticism will lead to the 
lowest Life Satisfaction scores. 
12) Nurturance is predicted to correlate 
positively with Life Satisfaction (Hypothesis 9), while 
no significant correlation is expected between Striving 
and Life Satisfaction {Hypothesis 10). The importance 
of Nurturance as opposed to Striving is expected to 
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hold in more detailed analyses---a significant positive 
relationship between Nurturance and Life Satisfaction 
is expected to occur, regardless of the level of 
striving involved. 
CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
2.-ubjects 
subjects were 65 student volunteers, recruited from 
various undergraduate psychology courses at the Loyola 
university Applied Psychology program. There were 53 
females (82%) and 12 males {18%). Fourteen percent of 
the students were in their freshman year of college, 
11% were sophomores, 22% juniors, and 38% were seniors. 
Eight percent had been in college longer than four 
years, and 8% failed to identify their level of 
education. Mean age of the group was 24.2 years. 
Eighty three percent of the subjects were single, 11% 
married, and 1 subject each classified themself as 
divorced, widowed, or engaged. The racial composition 
of the group was 65% Caucasian, 14% African-American, 
5% Semitic (Jewish or Arab), and 3% Hispanic. Eight 
percent were of mixed racial origin, while 6% failed to 
identify their racial background. The demographic 
information of this sample is shown in Table 1. 
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'.f?ble 1. 
Q_emographic information. 
b5J_e 
Mean age= 24.2 years 
sex 
Males= 12 (18%} 
Race 
Caucasian= 42 (65%} 
Semitic= 3 (5%) 
Mixed= 5 (8%} 
Marital Status 
Single= 54 (83%) 
Divorced= 1 (1.5%) 
Engaged= 1 (1.5%) 
Education Level 
Freshmen= 9 (14%) 
Juniors= 14 (22%) 
B. A. = 5 {8%) 
(Range: 18-43} 
Females= 53 (82%) 
African-American= 9 (14%) 
Hispanic= 2 (3%) 
Not Identified= 4 (6%). 
Married= 7 (11%) 
Widowed= 1 (1.5%) 
Not Identified= 1 (1.5%) 
Sophomores= 7 {11%) 
Seniors= 25 (38%) 
Not Identified= 5 (8%) 
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M?asures 
fil.Ological Personality Dimensions: NEO Personality 
Inventory 
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The NEO-PI is a 181-item questionnaire designed by 
costa & Mccrae (1985) to measure the personality traits 
of Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, 
Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. This study will 
limit itself to the Neuroticism and Extraversion 
dimensions, as these have been the most thoroughly 
validated. 
The subscales for Neuroticism are: Anxiety, 
Hostility, Depression, Self-consciousness, Impulsivity, 
and Vulnerability. Extraversion subscales include: 
Warmth, Gregariousness, Assertiveness, Activity, 
Excitement Seeking, and Positive Emotions. There are 8 
items for each of these subscales. Subjects are asked 
to indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement 
to items along a 5-point Likert scale. 
Mccrae & Costa ( 1983) , using self-reports on the 
NEO-PI and spouse ratings of each subject, obtained 
internal consistencies for the individual Neuroticism 
and Extraversion subscales which ranged from . 60 to 
.86, with similar figures for both males and females. 
Coefficient alpha ratings for Neuroticism and 
Extraversion were .93 and .89. Six month test-retest 
reliabilities were . 87 and . 91 for Extraversion and 
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Neuroticism (Mccrae & Costa (1983). 
In comparisons with scores from the Eysenck 
personality Questionnaire (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975), 
NEO scores for Neuroticism and Extraversion showed 
correlations of . 84 and . 76 respectively. Favorable 
convergent and discriminant-correlations between NEO-PI 
scores of Neuroticism and Extraversion and those of 
tests such as the Guilford-Zimmerman Temperament Survey 
(Guilford, Zimmerman, & Guilford, 1976), and the 
Cornell Medical Index (Brodman, Erdmann, Lorge, & 
Wolff, 1949) have been noted (Costa & Mccrae, 1985). 
Life Satisfaction: Satisfaction With Life Scale 
The SWLS (Diener et al, 1985) is designed to 
measure life satisfaction as a cognitive-judgmental 
process. The 5 item scale asks subjects to indicate 
the extent of their agreement or disagreement along a 
7-point Likert scale with subjective, global judgments 
about their lives. For scoring purposes, the item 
ratings are summed to produce a total life satisfaction 
score. 
Diener et al. (1985) obtained a 2-month test-
retest correlation coefficient of .82, with a .87 
coefficient alpha. A principal axis factor analysis on 
the inter-item correlation matrix showed one factor 
accounting for 66% of the variance. The factor 
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1oadings of the 5 items ranged from .61 to .84. Scores 
on the SWLS correlated . 02 with scores on a social 
desirability scale, the Marlowe-Crowne measure (Crowne 
& Marlowe, 1964), indicating the SWLS did not evoke a 
social desirability response set. Diener et al (1985) 
also found correlations of . 54 and - . 41 between SWLS 
scores and scores on measures of self-esteem and 
neuroticism, respectively. 
interviewer estimates of 
The SWLS correlation with 
life satisfaction was .43, 
suggesting that interviewer estimates were more 
influenced by affective content. This is consistent 
with results obtained elsewhere (Larsen, et al., 1983) 
which showed that the SWLS had weaker correlations with 
affect than measures of the broader construct, 
subjective well being. Finally, there was a 
correlation of . 57 with summed domain satisfactions, 
indicating that while global satisfaction and domain 
satisfactions share a significant amount of common 
variance, they are not equivalent constructs. 
Object Representation: Blatt•s Prose Description 
The prose descriptions are the descriptions of 
mother and father from the Family Interaction 
Questionnaire, described earlier. This study will add 
a description of a significant other. Subjects were 
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asked to "Describe your mother", "Describe your. 
father", and "Describe another important person in your 
life". Five minutes were allowed for each description. 
Parental descriptions are rated on a seven point 
scale in the categories of affection, ambition, 
benevolence, degree of family involvement, evaluative, 
intelligence, nurturance, punitive, personal strength, 
personal success, positive or admired ideal, and warmth 
(Blatt et al., 1979). A score of four is given if the 
judge is unable to make a decision or the category is 
not applicable. 
Inter-rater reliability estimates of the 
individual adjectival ratings ranged from .69 to .95 in 
the Blatt et al. (1979) study. The thirteen adjectives 
load onto two factors: Nurturant ( Factor I) , and 
Striving (Factor II). In a factor analysis, Blatt et 
al. (1979) found that Factor I accounted for 40% of the 
variance in their study, and Factor II was responsible 
for 29%. The following qualities have high loadings on 
Factor I: Nurturance ( .901), positive ideal ( .895), 
benevolent (. 879), warmth (. 870), family involvement 
(.840), affectionate (.795), strong (.665), and 
successful (.477). Adjectives which loaded onto Factor 
II were: Judgmental (.904), ambitious (.890), punitive 
(.881), intellectual (.816), strong (.665), and 
successful (.654) Blatt et al., (1988). In the present 
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study, those adjectives (strong and successful) which 
1oad onto both factors will not be used. 
In the Blatt et al. (1979) study, there were a 
number of significant correlations between the parental 
descriptions and ratings of each parent on the Semantic 
Differential (Osgood, suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957). Most 
impressive, and relevant to the present study in terms 
of construct validity, was the highly significant (2 < 
.001) positive relationship of the (Factor I) scale of 
both parental descriptions with all three basic factors 
(evaluation, potency, and activity) of the Semantic 
Differential. Factor I showed significant negative 
correlations with measures of depression, and parental 
descriptions which contained high levels of Factor I 
also correlated with a positive self-description on the 
Semantic Differential. The authors concluded that "It 
is the perception of parents as lacking in nurturance, 
support, and affection (Factor I) which is related to 
depression rather than perception of parents as 
striving, harsh, and judgmental (Factor II) (Blatt et 
al., 1979, p. 394). 
Procedure 
Data were collected from five different college 
undergraduate courses. There was an average of 14 
subjects per group, and a range of 6-25. Subjects 
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received course credit for their voluntary 
participation in the study. Participants were told 
that the study was concerned with the ways in which 
people view their parents, themselves, and their 
lives, and that they would be asked to provide 
descriptions and complete a number of questionnaires in 
these areas. After signing informed consents, 
participants were given 5 minutes to complete each 
description of Blatt•s Prose Description, and given 
instructions on how to complete each of the other 
measures in the research packet. These included the 
satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS), the Tennessee Self 
Concept Scale (TSCS--not used in data analysis for this 
study), the NEO Personality Inventory, and a 
demographic information sheet. Each session took 
approximately 40 minutes. Subjects were asked to fill 
out each home questionnaire in one sitting. 
Statistical Analyses 
In arriving at scores used in analyses for the 
representational personality dimensions (Nurturance and 
Striving), means of composite scores from each of the 
three sources (mother, father, and significant other) 
were used. To establish inter-rater reliability on the 
Blatt Prose Descriptions, all of the descriptions were 
scored by two raters, with consultation. Correlations 
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were computed between the two raters' scores on each of 
the thirteen adjectives which comprise the 
representational personality dimensions. Each of the 
raters was a graduate student in a doctoral level 
clinical psychology program. 
Pearson Product-Moment correlations were used to 
examine relationships between the variables 
Extraversion (E), Neuroticism (N), Nurturance (Nu), 
striving (St), and Life Satisfaction (LS). In 
addition, a total of six 2 X 2 simple effects analyses 
of variance (ANOVAs) were employed, which used high-low 
median splits for the variables E, N, Nu, and st. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
The data of this study fall into three clusters: 
Results of preliminary analyses, results dealing with 
relationships between temperamental and 
representational personality variables, and results 
addressing the interaction of personality variables and 
Life Satisfaction. 
Preliminary Results 
Given that the ratio of females to males in this 
sample was greater than 4:1 (82% to 18%), multiple~-
tests (two tailed) were computed, comparing female and 
male scores across all the variables. Male subjects 
tended to score somewhat higher in St than females 
(~(63) = .14, R =.125, two tailed), but this difference 
was not significant, and was by far the greatest 
difference observed between the sexes. 
The mean score for E was 114.66, with a standard 
deviation of 16.96. The median split for high versus 
low scores in ANOVA calculations was 114.0. For N, the 
mean score was 97. 08, with a standard deviation of 
22.11, and a median split of 95.0. The Nu mean was 
27.35, with a standard deviation of 3.71, and a median 
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split of 27.5. For st, the mean score was 14.70, with 
a standard deviation of 1. 74, and a median split of. 
14.83. The LS mean was 21.86, and a standard 
deviation of 5.98. Median splits were not required for 
calculations for LS. Means, medians, and standard 
deviations for all of the variables are shown in Table 
2. 
Each unstructured description of mother, father, 
and significant other was rated by two judges on each 
of the thirteen adjectival scales, which comprise the 
Nu and st representational dimensions. The following 
Pearson Product-Moment correlations were obtained on 
comparison of each judges' score. For the adjectives 
loading onto Nu: Affectionate = .56, Malevolent-
Benevolent = .65, Cold-Warm = .72, Degree of 
Constructive Involvement= .54, Negative-Positive Ideal 
= .81, Nurturant = . 71. For the Striving adjectives 
the correlations were: Ambitious= .68, Intellectual= 
. 77, Judgmental = . 74, Punitive = . 55. The average 
correlation between Nurturance adjectives was .67, and 
between Striving adjectives, .69. The average Pearson 
Product-Moment correlations between the two raters for 
all adjectives was .67. 
Table 3. 
These figures are 1 isted in 
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Table 2. 
M.,_ean scores I median splits. and standard deviations 
l_pD) for personality and life satisfaction variables. 
variable Mean Median SD 
E 114.66 114.00 16.96 
N 97.08 95.00 22.11 
Nu 27.35 27.50 3.71 
St 14.70 14.83 1.74 
LS 21.86 ----- 5.98 
.'.IJ:lble 3. 
£._earson correlation coefficients (Pearson r) of 
~ater's scorings for representational dimensions of 
Blatt Prose Descriptions. 
Nurturant Adjectives 
Affectionate 
Malevolent-Benevolent 
Cold-Warm 
Degree of Constructive 
Involvement 
Negative-Positive Ideal 
Nurturant 
Mean Adjective Correlation 
Striving Adjectives 
Ambitious 
Intellectual 
Judgmental 
Punitive 
Mean Adjective Correlation 
Pearson r 
.56 
.65 
.72 
.54 
.81 
.71 
.67 
Pearson 
.68 
.77 
.74 
.55 
-------
.69 
r 
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Relationships among E, N, Nu, and St 
A highly significant negative correlation between 
N and Nu (12 = . 004) was observed. This finding was 
predicted, as was the lack of correlation between E and 
Nu (12 = .51). However, it was also expected that st 
would correlate positively with both E and N. These 
predictions were disconfirmed by the data. In 
addition, there were trends towards negative 
correlations between E and N (12 = .066), and Nu and st 
(12 =.10). A correlation matrix showing the Pearson 
Product-Moment correlations for all the variables is 
displayed in Table 4. 
Interactions of E, Non Nu, St 
It was expected that N would affect Nu negatively, 
regardless of the level of E. An analysis of variance 
performed using Nu as the dependent variable with E and 
N as independent variables found a trend towards a main 
effect for N (E. {1,64} = 3.28, 12 = .075), with the 
lowest Nu scores occurring when N was high, consistent 
with predictions. 
It was also predicted that higher St scores would 
occur in those with high E and N, and vice-versa. An 
analysis of variance with St as the dependent variable 
and E and N as independent variables revealed no main 
effects or interactions, contradicting the predictions. 
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Results from both of these analyses of variance are 
reproduced in Table 5. 
Interactions of Nu, St on E. N 
An analysis of variance with E as the dependent 
variable and Nu and St as independent variables yielded 
a two-way interaction, Nu X St (f. { 1, 64} = 3. 7 3. 12. 
=.058). An inspection of cell means revealed that when 
high Nu was combined with high st, the lowest E scores 
occurred, while the highest levels of E were observed 
when high Nu and low st were combined. 
An analysis of variance with N as the dependent 
variable, and Nu and st as independent variables, 
revealed a significant main effect for Nu (E. {1,64} = 
10.74, 12. = .002). Results of these analyses are also 
shown in Table 5. 
Life Satisfaction 
There was a significant positive correlation 
between LS and Nu (12. = .027). While this result was 
expected, the prediction that LS and E would positively 
correlate did not hold. Another hypothesis, that LS 
and N would be negatively correlated, was borne out by 
the data (12. = . 01) . A final correlation hypothesis, 
that LS and St would not significantly correlate, was 
also confirmed. These results are reported in Table 4. 
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Table 4. 
pearson correlation coefficients for personality 
variables and life satisfaction. 
E 
E 
N -.2291* 
Nu .0824 
St -.1489 
LS -.0059 
*R < .10 
**R < .05 
***R < .01 
N 
-.2291* 
-.3872*** 
.0490 
-.3175*** 
Nu St LS 
.0824 -.1489 -.0059 
-.3872*** .0490 -.3175*** 
-.2058* .2746** 
-.2058* .0222 
.2746** .0222 
Table 5. 
observed cell means of Nurturance and Striving 
scores as a function of high and low Extraversion 
and Neuroticism. 
Observed Means 
High E 
Low E 
Observed Means 
High E 
Low E 
Nurturance Scores 
High N 
26.38 
26.48 
Striving 
High N 
14.42 
14.79 
Low N 
28.21 
28.11 
Scores 
Low N 
14.70 
14.81 
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Table 6. 
observed cell means of Extraversion and Neuroticisrn 
scores as a function of high and low Nurturance and 
striving. 
Observed Means 
High St 
Low St 
Observed Means 
High St 
Low St 
Extraversion Scores 
High Nu 
109.19 
123.40 
Neuroticisrn 
High Nu 
91.88 
84.33 
Low Nu 
114.17 
112.50 
Scores 
Low Nu 
105.72 
104.50 
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Interactions of E, N, Nu, st on LS 
An analysis of variance in 
dependent variable, with E and 
which 
N the 
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LS was the 
variables, revealed a two-way interaction 
independent 
of EX N 
(E{l,64} = 3.87. 2 = .054). Inspection of cell means 
clearly shows that the highest LS scores resulted from 
high E with low N, and that the lowest LS scores came 
with high E and high N. While the former result was 
hypothesized, the latter was not. 
A final analysis of variance used LS as the 
dependent variable with Nu and St the independent 
variables. In this case, there was a significant main 
effect for Nu (E{l,64) = 4.52, 2 = .038). Cell means 
indicate that LS scores covary positively with Nu 
scores. Results of these final two analyses of 
variance are reproduced in Table 7. 
Table 7. 
observed cell means of Life Satisfaction as a 
function of high and low Extraversion. Neuroticism. 
Nurturance and Striving. 
Observed Means 
High N 
Low N 
Observed Means 
High St 
Low St 
Life Satisfaction Scores 
High E 
18.73 
23.95 
Low E 
21.85 
21.15 
Life Satisfaction Scores 
High Nu 
24.06 
22.87 
Low Nu 
19.67 
21.19 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
The N. Nu Reciprocal Relationship 
All of the hypotheses con'cerning N and Nu were 
solidly supported by the results obtained. The single 
strongest finding of this study is the negative 
relationship between N and Nu, for which there may be 
several possible explanations. Object relations theory 
suggests that early and repeatedly non-nurturant 
relationships would directly lead to the same type of 
emotional experiences (anxiety, depression, and so on) 
expected in high N individuals. It may be that there 
are two paths to the emotional experience of the high N 
individual, each potentiating the other---being born 
with physiologies producing levels of negative 
affectivity which are both strong and of relatively 
long duration, and the experience of early and 
consistently non-nurturant or depriving relationships. 
Object relations theory also implies that 
nurturing environmental responses would have little if 
any lasting impact on the infant unless they can be 
internalized. The infant high in N might be impaired 
in the ability to internalize nurturing responses due 
to a preoccupation with it's innate and regenerating 
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flow of negative affectivity. 
On the other hand, those with high levels of N may 
evoke less nurturant responses from others, leading to 
less nurturant representations, which in turn shape 
other relational experiences. From this perspective, 
relational experiences would be influential in shaping 
the neurotic experience. 
Blatt et al. (1979), distinguished between 
anaclitic and introjective depression, where anaclitic 
depressives (presumably due to severe early 
deprivation) have representational structures which are 
so impaired that they are unable to maintain contact 
with the object in it's absence. Introjective 
depressives, while able to maintain this contact due to 
more highly developed representational structures, 
nevertheless suffer constant fear of losing the object 
due to perceived negative aspects of themselves. It is 
possible to conceive of the anaclitic depressive as a 
high N individual who experienced extremely non-
nurturant early relationships, while the introjective 
depressive might also be a high N person who had more 
nurturant interpersonal experiences. Even if anaclitic 
depressives start with only moderate levels of N, these 
levels would seem likely to be accentuated with severe 
early deprivations. On the other hand, even highly 
nurturant relationships may be able to do no more than 
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moderate the impact of temperamentally based sources of 
N, such as those theorized here to be present in 
introjective depression. In this latter case, it may 
also be postulated that any deprivation would be 
heightened in terms of experience and recall (see 
Mayman's {1968} view of early memories as unconsciously 
selected to confirm existing personality structure). 
Nu and Positive and Negative Affect 
Recall that Positive Affect (PA) involves a 
component of animation, which manifests itself in an 
appetite for life stimuli. Hypothesis 2 theorized that 
Nu does not directly relate to this type of high energy 
level, and would therefore not significantly correlate 
with E, as E closely resembles PA (Meyer, 1987). This 
hypothesis was supported by the data, and is 
interesting in light of the significant negative 
relationship found between Nu and N (and thus Negative 
Affect {NA}) . Thus, while Nu appears important in 
terms of limiting or encouraging NA, (or N), it does 
not display a primary relationship to PA (or E). 
The Puzzling Dimension of St 
St was expected to be positively correlated. to 
both E and N. These predictions were based on the 
seeming similarity of adjectives loading onto St to 
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both E ("ambitious"), and N ("punitive", "judgmental"). 
However, st showed no significant correlations with 
either E or N. One possible explanation is that if the 
aspects of Positive and Negativity are both contained 
within the St dimension, they may work to neutralize 
each other, leaving st relatively unrelated to any of 
the variables used in this study. Although N and E did 
not work together in any combination to impact on st 
(as was predicted), it may be that with only four 
adjectives loading onto st (one of which, 
11 intellectual", seems affectively neutral) , there is 
not enough opportunity for opposing elements of 
Positive and Negative Affectivity to eclipse the other, 
for example, in the case of high N and low E. 
The Inter-Relatedness of Nu, st and E 
There was one instance where St related in a 
significant way to the other personality variables; 
this was also the only case where Nu had even an 
indirect bearing on E. It appears that high levels of 
Nu can influence E through St, which showed a negative 
relationship to E when Nu was high. When low levels of 
Nu are present, st appears less influential to E. 
An explanation may come through the already 
observed sensitivity of Nu to N (or NA). E scores were 
by far the highest when combined with high Nu and low 
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st. This would suggest not only that Nu, while not the 
same dimension as PA, may be conducive to PA, but that 
the dimension of st may contain more negative than 
positive affective elements. 
In sum, it appears that there are significant and 
reciprocal relationships between temperamental and 
relational dimensions of personality; more 
specifically, that N and Nu are strongly negatively 
related, as are E and st when Nu is high. In addition, 
it is useful to consider the dimensions of PA and NA in 
understanding the interaction of the personality 
variables. The strength and clarity of these 
relationships would be expected to increase within a 
larger sample. 
LS. Affect. and Personality 
The significant positive relationship of Nu and LS 
was also expected, and perhaps necessary in terms of 
construct validation for Nu. Although there has been 
little in the way of empirical linkage between 
dimensions of object representation and subjective life 
satisfaction, findings by Blatt et al. (1979) and 
others, as well as general object relations tenets 
suggest that representational dimensions, and 
particularly nurturance, will impact on life 
adjustment, and presumably, subjective assessment of 
satisfaction with life. 
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It is hard to imagine giving 
much credibility to the construct of Nu if it did not 
relate positively to LS. 
Affective variables seem basic to LS, given the 
resemblance of PA and NA to Bradburn's (1969) positive 
and negative affect. This conclusion is only 
strengthened by the results obtained here: The 
dimension of Nu can be seen in part as an 
internalization of positive emotion (but not PA) or 
elements which induce positive emotion (e.g., 
descriptions which load onto the Nu dimension include 
"affectionate", "degree of constructive involvement", 
"nurturant"). on the other hand, the strong negative 
correlation between N and LS speaks directly to the 
effect of NA on satisfaction with life. Although LS 
is clearly a cognitive element, it seems just as 
clearly to be affected by feeling states. 
The implication is that personality 
characteristics which most impact upon subjective 
emotional experiences will be the most influential upon 
LS. This may be the reason why E was not correlated 
significantly with LS, but did interact with N to 
produce an effect (high E and low N interacted to 
produce low LS scores). Again, the animation and 
arousal that is part of E, is not necessarily the same 
as pleasant emotion. st did not associate 
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significantly with LS probably because it appears to be 
a weak, or perhaps mixed bearer of NA. It is possible 
that with a larger sample, E and St might show more 
direct connections to LS. 
Future Research 
Clearly, all of the variables used in this study 
are either strongly affected by affect, are closely 
related to affective states, or both. Although 
indications are St may be related, if weakly, to PA, it 
is the possible exception, and future work could focus 
on clarifying this construct. Is it a slightly 
negative mix of variables containing primarily PA and 
NA, or does it contain significant other aspects as 
well? 
In any case, from the results noted here, a strong 
statement can be made here for the importance of 
emotional experience, both to personality and life 
experience. As all of the personality variables 
examined are quite broad, it is believed that a 
substantial portion of general personality structure is 
represented here. Future efforts might consider 
examining aspects of personality which are less 
apparently related to affect, for example, Blatt et 
al., 's (1979) cognitive complexity, or Blatt & 
Ritzler's (1974) conception of boundaries. 
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The reciprocal relationship of temperament and 
representational structures has received little 
attention to date, and promises to be a rich area for 
future research. Future studies could also increase 
the sample size examined, to allow for more complex 
analyses, and strengthen effects which may be unclear. 
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The NEO Personality Inventory (Form S) 
Instructions: 
On the accompanying answer sheet, please fill in your 
name, age, the date, and your sex, using a No. 2 
pencil. Mark "Self" in the labeled "Form". Please 
make all your answers on the answer sheet; do not write 
in this test booklet. 
This questionnaire contains 181 statements. Read each 
carefully. For each statement darken the one bubble on 
the answer sheet which best represents your opinion, 
making sure that your answer is in the correctly 
numbered space. 
Mark "SD" 
Mark "D11 
Mark "N" 
Mark "A" 
Mark "SA" 
if the statement is definitely false 
or you strongly disagree. 
if the statement is mostly false or 
you disagree. 
if the statement is about equally true 
or false, or if you cannot decide, or 
if you are neutral on the statement. 
if the statement is mostly true or you 
agree. 
if the statement is definitely true or 
you strongly agree. 
There are no "right" or "wrong" answers, and you need 
not be an "expert" to complete this questionnaire. The 
purpose of this questionnaire will be best served if 
you describe yourself and state your opinions as 
accurately as possible. 
Please read each item carefully and mark the one bubble 
that best corresponds to your agreement or 
disagreement. Answer every item. Note that the answers 
are numbered down the columns on the answer sheet, and 
make sure that your answer is marked in the correctly 
numbered space. If you change your mind, please erase 
your first answer completely. 
1. I really like most people I meet. 
2. I have a very active imagination. 
3. I often feel tense and jittery. 
4. I shy away from crowds of people. 
5. I keep my belongings neat and clean. 
6. Aesthetic and artistic concerns aren't 
important to me. 
7. I'm an even-tempered person. 
8. I am dominant, forceful, and assertive. 
9. Without strong emotions, life would be 
uninteresting to me. 
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10. I'm pretty good about pacing myself so as to get 
things done on time. 
11. Sometimes I feel completely worthless. 
12. I don't get much pleasure from chatting with 
people. 
13. I try to keep all my thoughts directed along 
realistic lines and avoid flights of fancy. 
14. I rarely feel fearful or anxious. 
15. I try to perform all the tasks assigned to me 
conscientiously. 
16. I like to have a lot of people around me. 
17. I am sometimes completely absorbed in music I am 
listening to. 
18. I often get angry at the way people treat me. 
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19. I sometimes fail to assert myself as much as I 
should. 
20. I have a clear set of goals and work toward them in 
an orderly fashion. 
21. I rarely experience strong emotions. 
22. I have sometimes experienced a deep sense of guilt 
or sinfulness. 
23. I'm known as a warm and friendly person. 
24. I have an active fantasy life. 
25. I work hard to accomplish my goals. 
26. I am easily frightened. 
27. I usually prefer to do things alone. 
28. Watching ballet or modern dance bores me. 
29. I am not considered a touchy or temperamental 
person. 
30. I am not a very methodical person. 
31. I never hesitate to assert my rights if I feel I'm 
being taken advantage of. 
32. How I feel about things is important to me. 
33. I tend to blame myself when anything goes wrong. 
34. Many people think of me as somewhat cold and 
distant. 
35. I pay my debts promptly and in full. 
36. I don't like to waste my time daydreaming. 
37. I am not a worrier. 
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38. I really feel the need for other people if I am by 
myself for long. 
39. Certain kinds of music have an endless fascination 
for me. 
40. I waste a lot of time before settling down to work. 
41. I am known as hot-blooded and quick-tempered. 
42. In meetings, I usually let others do the talking. 
43. I find it hard to get in touch with my feelings. 
44. I have a low opinion of myself. 
45. I try to jobs carefully, so they won't have to be 
done again. 
46. I really enjoy talking to people. 
47. I enjoy concentrating on a fantasy or daydream and 
exploring all its possibilities, letting it grow and 
develop. 
48. I often worry about things that might go wrong. 
49. I prefer small parties to large ones. 
50. Sometimes I'm not as dependable or reliable as I 
should be. 
51. Poetry has little or no effect on me. 
52. It takes a lot to get me mad. 
53. I have often been a leader of groups I have 
belonged to. 
54. I experience a wide range of emotions or feelings. 
55. I strive to achieve all I can. 
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56. Sometimes things look pretty bleak and hopeless to 
me. 
57. I find it easy to smile and be outgoing with 
strangers. 
58. If I feel my mind starting to drift off into 
daydreams, I usually get busy and start concentrating 
on some work or activity instead. 
59. Frightening thoughts sometimes come into my head. 
60. When I make a commitment, I can always be counted 
on to follow through. 
61. I'd rather vacation at a popular beach than an 
isolated cabin in the woods. 
62. I am intrigued by the patterns I find in art and 
nature. 
63. I often get disgusted with people I have to deal 
with. 
64. I would rather go my own way than be a leader of 
men. 
65. I like to keep everything in its place so I know 
just where it is. 
66. I seldom pay much attention to my feelings of the 
moment. 
67. I rarely feel lonely or blue. 
68. I have strong emotional attachments to my friends. 
69. As a child I rarely enjoyed games of make believe. 
70. I never seem to be able to get organized. 
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71. I'm seldom apprehensive about the future. 
72. I prefer jobs that let me work alone without being 
bothered by other people. 
73. sometimes when I am reading poetry or looking at a 
work of art, I feel a chill or wave of excitement. 
74. People I work or associate with find me easy to get 
along with. 
75. I am a productive person who always gets the job 
done. 
76. Other people often look to me to make decisions. 
77. I seldom notice the moods or feelings that 
different environments produce. 
78. Too often, when things go wrong, I get discouraged 
and feel like giving up. 
79. I take a personal interest in the people I work 
with. 
80. I tend to be somewhat fastidious or exacting. 
81. I would have difficulty just letting my mind wander 
without control or guidance. 
82. I have fewer fears than most people. 
83. I would rather watch an event on television than be 
there in the audience. 
84. I enjoy reading poetry that emphasizes feelings and 
images more than story lines. 
85. I strive for excellence in everything I do. 
86. There are some people I really hate. 
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87. Others think of me as being modest and unassuming. 
88. I find it easy to empathize--to feel myself what 
others are feeling. 
89. I am seldom sad or depressed. 
90. I am easy-going and lackadaisical. 
91. I'm not the kind of person who must always be busy 
with something. 
92. I'm pretty set in my ways. 
93. I seldom feel self-conscious when I'm around 
people. 
94. I often crave excitement. 
95. I believe that most people are basically well-
intentioned. 
96. I often enjoy playing with theories or abstract 
ideas. 
97. I have trouble resisting my cravings. 
98. I have never literally jumped for joy. 
99. I believe letting students hear controversial 
speakers can only confuse and mislead them. 
100. I often get into arguments with my family and co-
workers. 
101. I feel I M capable of coping with most of my 
problems. 
102. When I do things, I do them vigorously. 
103. I think it's interesting to learn and develop new 
hobbies. 
90 
104. In dealing with other people, I always dread 
making a social blunder. 
105. I go out of my way to help others if I can. 
106. I have sometimes done things just for "kicks" or 
"thrills". 
107. I enjoy solving problems or puzzles. 
108. I rarely overindulge in anything. 
109. I have sometimes experienced intense joy or 
ecstasy. 
110. It wouldn't bother me if I had to punish a child 
or pet. 
111. I believe that laws and social policies should 
change to reflect the needs of a changing world. 
112. I often feel helpless and want someone else to 
solve my problems. 
113. I have a leisurely style in work and play. 
114. I like to follow a strict routine in my work. 
115. I think most of the people I deal with are honest 
and trustworthy. 
116. It doesn't embarrass me too much if people 
ridicule and tease me. 
117. I like to be where the action is. 
118. I enjoy working on "mind-twister" puzzles. 
119. When I am having my favorite foods, I tend to eat 
too much. 
120. I try to be courteous to everyone I meet. 
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121. I am not a cheerful optimist. 
122. I believe we should look to our religious 
authorities for decisions on moral issues. 
123. I keep a cool head in emergencies. 
124. I often feel as if I'm bursting with energy. 
125. Starving masses in foreign countries leave me 
pretty cold. 
126. Once I find the right way to do something, I stick 
to it. 
127. At times I have been so ashamed I just wanted to 
hide. 
128. Fast cars and motorcycles have never had much 
appeal to me. 
129. I find philosophical arguments boring. 
130. Some people think I'm selfish and egotistical. 
131. I have little difficulty resisting temptation. 
132. Sometimes I bubble with happiness. 
133. I believe that the different ideas of right and 
wrong that people in other societies have may be valid 
for them. 
134. When I'm under a great deal of stress, sometimes I 
feel like I'm going to pieces. 
135. I tend to be cynical and skeptical of others' 
intentions. 
136. My work is likely to be slow but steady. 
137. I often try new and foreign foods. 
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138. I often feel inferior to others. 
139. I love the excitement of roller coasters. 
140. I would rather cooperate with others than compete 
with them. 
141. I sometimes lose interest when people talk about 
very abstract, theoretical matters. 
142. I sometimes eat myself sick. 
143. I don't consider myself especially "light-
hearted". 
144. I believe that loyalty to one's ideals and 
principles is more important than "open-mindedness". 
145. I believe that most people will take advantage of 
you if you let them. 
146. I can handle myself pretty well in a crisis. 
147. I usually seem to be in a hurry. 
148. I prefer to spend my time in familiar 
surroundings. 
149. I feel comfortable in the presence of my bosses or 
other authorities. 
150. Some people think of me as cold and calculating. 
151. I wouldn't enjoy vacationing in Las Vegas. 
152. I have little interest in speculating on the 
nature of the universe or the human condition. 
153. I am always able to keep my feelings under 
control. 
154. I am a cheerful, high-spirited person. 
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155. Most people I know like me. 
156. I consider myself broad-minded and tolerant of 
other people's lifestyles. 
157. It's often hard for me to make up my mind. 
158. My life is fast-paced. 
159. On a vacation, I prefer going back to a tried and 
true spot. 
160. I'm hard-headed and tough-minded in my attitudes. 
161. If I have said or done the wrong thing to someone, 
I can hardly bear to face them again. 
162. I'm attracted to bright colors and flashy styles. 
163. I have a lot of intellectual curiosity. 
164. Sometimes I do things on impulse that I later 
regret. 
165. I generally try to be thoughtful and considerate. 
166. I rarely use words like "fantastic!" or 
"sensational!" to describe my experiences. 
167. I think that if people don't know what they 
believe in by the time they' re 25, there's something 
wrong with them. 
168. When everything seems to be going wrong, I can 
still make good decisions. 
169. I am a very active person. 
170. If I don't like people, I let them know it. 
171. I follow the same route when I go someplace. 
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172. When people I know do foolish things, I get 
embarrassed for them. 
173. I tend to avoid movies that are shocking or scary. 
174. I have a wide range of intellectual interests. 
175. In most situations, I try to be aware of how 
others are thinking and feeling. 
176. I seldom give in to my impulses. 
177. I laugh easily. 
178. I believe that the "new morality" of 
permissiveness is no morality at all. 
179. I'm pretty stable emotionally. 
180. If necessary, I am willing to manipulate people to 
get what I want. 
181. I have tried to answer all these question honestly 
and accurately. 
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The Satisfaction With Life Scale 
Below are five statements with which you may agree or 
disagree. Using the 1-7 scale below, indicate your 
agreement with each i tern by placing the appropriate 
number on the line preceding that item. Please be open 
and honest in your responding. 
The 7-point scale is: l=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 
3=slightly disagree, 4= neither agree nor disagree, 
5=slightly agree, 6=agree ?=strongly agree. 
---1. In most ways my life is close to my ideal. 
---2. The conditions of my life are excellent. 
---3. I am satisfied with my life. 
___ 4. So far I have gotten the important things I 
want in life. 
___ 5. If I could live my life over, I would change 
almost nothing. 
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Parental Descriptions 
Please note that for the purposes of this part of the 
study we are equating your parents with your primary 
caretakers. You may use the back of this sheet if you 
need more space to write. Please stop writing when 
instructed. You will have 5 minutes for each 
description. 
Describe your mother. 
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Describe your father. 
98 
Describe another important person in your life (this 
may be anyone, such as another relative, a friend, a 
teacher, etc.). Please add over what ages you knew (or 
know) that person. 
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